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LEGALITY OF REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT

UNDER SECTION 3 OF THE CLAYTON ACT

Plaintiff, a public utility furnishing electric energy to an
area adjacent to and including the City of Tampa, supplied power to approximately eleven percent of the population of the State
of Florida. In 1955, the plaintiff company decided to expand its
facilities by constructing another plant which was to consume
coal as fuel, instead of the fuel oil which plaintiff, like most
other utilities in the State of Florida, had previously utilized in
its plants.' Pursuant to this decision, plaintiff contracted with
defendant for the supply of coal, the contract calling for delivery to begin in 1957. The contract provided that the amount
purchased by the plaintiff would never be below 225,000 tons per
year, although it was estimated that the amount used would increase to approximately 2,250,000 tons per year. Defendant coal
company was one of some 700 producers in the Appalachian Coal
Area who were in a position to serve the Tampa market. Before
the proposed date of delivery, defendant notified the plaintiff
that it would not perform because in its opinion the contract was
violative of the anti-trust laws.2 After securing another supply
for its coal requirements on a temporary basis, the plaintiff
petitioned for a declaratory judgment holding the contract not
violative of the anti-trust laws.- The district court granted summary judgment 4 for defendant on the ground that the contract
was illegal under Section 3 of the Clayton Act; the court of
appeals affirmed.5 On writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, held, reversed. As the contract only foreclosed
approximately 1% of the relevant market involved, Section 3 of
the Clayton Act 6 was not violated because a substantial share of
1. The Court stated that "every electrical generating plant in peninsular
Florida burned oil at the time" of the consummation of the contract. Tampa
Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 81 Sup. Ct. 623, 625 (1961). A 1958 estimate
of the consumption of coal in the peninsular Florida area showed that the rate
of consumption was 700,000 tons annually, and the record indicated that the
plaintiff's consumption would equal that amount in 1959 and 1960, and would
thereafter increase to a maximum figure of "about 2,250,000 tons annually."
Ibid.
2. The defendant claimed that the contract was invalid under the provisions
of Section 3 of the Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952), quoted in part
at note 6 infra, Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., .168 F. Supp. 456, 459
(M.D. Tenn. 1958).
3. The suit was instituted pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

(1952).
4. On defendant's

motion,

Tampa

Electric

Co. v. Nashville

Coal Co.,

168

F. Supp. 456 (M.D. Tenn. 1958).
5. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 276 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1960)
(dissent by Weick, J.).

6. "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
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the relevant market was not foreclosed. Tampa Electric Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
When it became apparent that the Sherman Act of 1890 was
ineffective in coping with many restraints of trade because of its
very broad terms and the elusive "rule of reason" which the
courts used in interpreting the statute,7 Congress enacted the
Clayton Act of 1914. This legislation was designed to eliminate
ambiguities urged as defenses under the prior law, and was specifically aimed at some of the more frequent restraints of competition such as exclusive dealing, mergers, and price discrimination.8 However, the Clayton Act was not free from ambiguities, particularly with regard to Section 3 concerning exclusive
dealing. 9 Much confusion has been engendered by the part of
the section referred to as the "competitive impact clause," which
states that exclusive dealing is prohibited where the "effect...
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly."1 0
Early cases interpreting Section 3 noted that Congress did
not intend to reach "every remote lessening of competition," but
of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or, contract for sale of goods . . . for
use, consumption, or resale within the United States . . . on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal
in the goods . . . of a competitor or competitors of the . . . seller, where the
effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or
understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952).
7. The case which is credited as having given birth to the "rule of reason"
as a rule of interpretation of the Sherman Act of 1890 was that of Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). For further enunciation of the rule
of reason, see Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918) : "The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the husiness to which the
restraint is applied.'. . . The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts . . . . knowledge of intent may help the court to
interpret facts and to predict consequences." See also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) ; United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 191 Fed. 371, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
8. Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Competition-The Impact of Standard
Oil Co. of California v. United States on the Standard of Legality Under the
Clayton Act, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 10 (1950). President Wilson had personally
called for the law to be drafted "in such terms as will practically eliminate
uncertainty." NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 186 (Cambridge 1960).
9. The House Judiciary Committee reported in 1914 that the measure treating
of exclusive dealing, Section 3 of the act, "has apparently been much misunderstood, and great confusion seems to have arisen in regard to its provisions." H.R.
Rep. No. 627, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1914). For fuller discussion of the
legislative history of this provision, See Hodson, EXCLUSIVE DEALING, published
in VAN CISE & DUNN, How To COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 140 (1954),
and NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 185-88 (Cambridge 1960).
. 10. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952).
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only that lessening of competition which may be said to be "substantial."" Such an explanation was apparently due to a realization that not all such agreements were aimed at stifling of competition, but that valid and justifiable business considerations
might be served by certain exclusive arrangements. 2 However,
delineation between a contract involving a "remote lessening of
competition" not in violation of Section 3 and one which results
in "substantial lessening of competition" has proved to be difficult.
The early rule was that if the practical effect of the contract
was to prevent competition in a given market area, it violated
the provision under consideration, if there was some showing of
competitive injury.' 3 A finding that the seller held a dominant
position in the market would be sufficient to support an inference that competition would be adversely affected by the con14
tract.
The main practices which Section 3 seeks to regulate are the
"requirement contract" and the "tying arrangement." A tying
arrangement results when a supplier furnishes a product over
which he has a measure of market control, but on the condition
that the buyer take with this "controlled product," a "tied product" which would be easily available from the competitors of the
supplier. An example of this sort of transaction would be where
a manufacturer of computing machinery requires the buyers of
his machine also to purchase the cards to be used in the machine.
There seems to be general agreement with the observation that
this kind of agreement serves "hardly any purpose beyond the
suppression of competition, ' 1 5 and the usual defense of protection of good will of the controlled product is rarely presented to
any avail.' 6
11. E.g., Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356-57
(1922).
12. Discussions of the benefits which may be produced by the requirements
contract, and its concomitant economic and legal ramifications, may be found
in the following: Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in
Determining Whether Exclusive Dealing Arrangements Violate Section 8 of the
Clayton Act, 65 HARv. L. REV. 913 (1952) ; McLaren, Related Problems of
"Requirements" Contracts and Acquisitions in Vertical Integration Under the
Anti-Trust Laws, 45 ILL. L. REv. 141 (1950) ; Sotckhausen, The Commercial and
Anti-Trust Aspects of Term Requirements Contracts, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 412
(1948).
13. United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
14. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
15. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949).
16. See, e.g., the answer to the defense of protection of good will in International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936) :
"Appellant is not prevented from proclaiming the virtues of its own cards or
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A requirement contract is one in which the buyer contracts
with a supplier to purchase whatever his requirements for the
product may be within a given time period, usually with a maximum quantity established. There are several plausible reasons
why a businessman might want to enter into this type of agreement with his customers other than a desire to foreclose competition. Some of the reasons most often advanced are: protection against future price increases, elimination of much of
the risk and expense of storage of surplus supplies, and more
accurate long-term planning on the basis of known costs. 7
In 1947, the Supreme Court, in a case involving a tying arrangement, United States v. InternationalSalt Co.,' espoused the
rule that there is no need for a full economic analysis in order
to determine whether or not a tying arrangement had transgressed the terms of Section 3, as long as it is established that
the amount of the business affected was not "insignificant or
insubstantial."' 19 Two years later, in the celebrated Standard
Stations case,20 the Court carried this rule into the area of requirements contracts, and announced the rule which is now referred to as the "quantitative substantiality" doctrine for the
interpretation of Section 3. This doctrine was explained by the
Court as requiring at least some proof that "competition has
been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce
affected."' 2 1 The Court rejected the contention that it should require a fuller examination of economic considerations in requirements contract cases than it had required in the tying arrangement cases. Mr. Justice Frankfurter explained in the majority
opinion that such a criterion would require extensive economic
evaluations for which courts were not equipped. 22 The Standard
warning against the danger of using, in its machines, cards which do not conform

to the necessary specifications, or even from making its leases conditional upon
the use of cards which conform to them." See also International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) ; United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United
States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922). However, the defense will prevail in certain special
circumstances. Such was the case in United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.,
187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), a
situation in which the defendant was a relative newcomer to the field of antenna
systems which, in many cases, had to be produced on a "custom made" basis. The

court held that the defense of protection of good will was valid, at least for the
formative period of the company's business.

17. These purposes were recognized in the majority opinion of Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1949) (hereinafter referred to as
Standard Station).
18. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
19. Id. at 396.
20. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
21. Id. at 314.
22. The majority felt that this would be a "standard of proof, if not virtually
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Stations decision has been criticized for the inflexibility of its
rule and for refusing to recognize the inherent differences between a tying arrangement and a requirements contract. 23
In addition to arousing criticism, the application of such a
rigid rule to the area of requirements contracts created problems

in the enforcement of Section 3. While the strict "quantitative
substantiality" rule has been followed by the courts,2 4 the Fed-

eral Trade Commission has, in several cases, demonstrated reluctance to follow the rule.

'

This attitude was given expression

in the Maico case, in which the Commission stated it could not
conclude that "evidence of the effect of an exclusive dealing
agreement on competition is immaterial in a Federal Trade Commission proceeding alleging violation of Section 3 of the Clayton

Act."

26

To measure the "substantiality" of the competitive injury
caused by a supplier, a determination of the "area of effective
competition" or the "relevant market" of the supplied product
must be made. 27 Also important is the "line of commerce" with
which the contract is concerned, i. e., the product for which the
competitive injury is to be ascertained. The reason given for
reversal in the instant case was the failure of the lower courts
to make a finding as to the relevant market of effective competition. Both the lower courts assumed that the area of effective competition was merely peninsular Florida, but the Court
'28
decided that it did "not believe that the pie will slice so thinly,

impossible to meet, at least most ill-suited for ascertainment by courts." Id. at 310.
23. One writer criticized the decision as "bordering on per se illegality."

Johnson, Some Twilight Zone Antitrust Problems, 1 ANTTPRUST BULLETIN 615,
624 (1956). Similar characterizations of the rule of quantitative substantiality
may be found in NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 194 (1960) ; Robin-

son, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45 CORN. L.Q. 254,
276 (1960), and ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE ANTITRUST REPORT

147 (1955).
24. Dictograph Products, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 217 F.2d 821
(2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955) Anchor Serum Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Sun Oil Co.,
176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
25. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 50 F.T.C. 1047 (1954) ; Anchor Serum Co.,
50 F.T.C. 681 (1954) ; Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953).
26. Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485, 487 (1953).
27. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
See also, for a work dealing specifically with the problems engendered in the determination of the market, Comment, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 580 (1954). It is interesting
that the author of this article took the rule of Standard Stations to be so strict
as to foreclose any consideration of the "relevant market." "Consequently, the
application of Section 3 does not require analysis of' the market concept." Id.
at 584. The instant case makes it clear that an analysis of the relevant market
is a necessity in exclusive dealing cases.
28. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 81 S.Ct. 623, 630 (1961).
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and defined the relevant market as a seven-state area. When
the anticipated coal requirements of the plaintiff were compared
with the amount of coal furnished out of this area, the resultant
percentage figure was less than 1% - "conservatively speaking,
quite insubstantial.1

29

The instant case points up the extremely important place
occupied by a correct determination of the relevant market in
which a given product competes. It may be even more valuable
in the future, however, because of some statements in the opinion
which seem to indicate that the Court may reconsider its position in Standard Stations. This inference is premised upon a
passage in the Court's opinion in which it inferred that it may
weigh valid business purposes before invalidating requirements
contracts under Section 3210 The Court also quoted favorably
from the parts of the opinion in Standard Stations which recognized desirable features of requirements contracts. 31 The instant
case may well provide a laudable and sorely needed element of
flexibility in the application of Section 3 to requirements contracts, and will help bring the judicial standard of legality under
this provision closer to that which has been administratively
employed for some time.
James A. George

TORTS -

AUTOMOBILE GUEST PASSENGERS

-

CONTRIBUTORY

NEGLIGENCE AS BAR TO RECOVERY FROM THIRD PARTIES

Plaintiff sued to recover for personal injuries resulting from
a collision involving an automobile in which he was a guest

passenger and a bus owned by the defendant. The plaintiff and
his host had been drinking together before the accident occurred.
The court of appeal of Louisiana found the negligence of plain29. Id. at 631. The Court in this case did not make a determination of the
line of commerce affected by the contract because of its disposition of the relevant
market question. Rather, it assumed that it was bituminous coal.
30. The passage under consideration is: "In judging the term of a requirements contract in relation to the substantiality of the foreclosure of competition,
particularized consideration of the parties' operations are not irrelevant." Id. at
632. Another statement of interest: "[A]t least in the case of public utilities the
assurance of a steady and ample supply of fuel is necessary in the public interest."
I bid.
31. Id. at 631.

